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EXTRACTION OF FRAUD SCHEMES FROM TRADE
SERIES
Charalambos Moussas Veska Noncheva
It is very often the case that the patterns of a fraudulent activity in trade
are hidden within existing trade data time series. Furthermore, with the ad-
vent of powerful and affordable computing hardware, relatively big amounts
of available trade data can be quickly analyzed with a view to assisting anti-
fraud investigations in this field. In this paper, based on the availability of
such import/export data series, we present a statistical method for the iden-
tification of potential fraud schemes, by extracting and highlighting those
cases which lend themselves to further investigation by anti-fraud domain
experts. The proposed method consists in applying time series analysis for
prediction purposes, calculating the resulting significant deviations, and fi-
nally clustering time series with similar patterns together, thus identifying
suspect or abnormal cases.
1. Introduction
There is an increasing interest in the application of statistical data analysis meth-
ods in the area of anti-fraud in general. This is mainly due to the wide availability
of big amounts of related data in electronic form, and the need to turn this data
into useful information in order to be able to detect fraudulent activities as soon
as possible.
Information on the trade of goods is typically made available through both
national and international statistical offices. In this respect, their role is to collect,
2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: 62H30, 62M10, 62M20, 62P20, 94A13
Key words: Fraud Detection, Time Series Analysis, Forecasting, Cluster Analysis
272 Ch. Moussas, V. Noncheva
process, and disseminate import/export indicators, such as the quantity and the
value of the trading goods. One of the main sources of this kind of information is
the national customs authorities. Thus, data is usually collected during customs
procedures and subsequently forwarded to the appropriate statistical offices, on
a monthly basis. As a result, monthly import/export data can be made available
in the form of monthly trade series which can be further analyzed, by using
time series analysis, with a view to discovering trends matching suspected fraud
patterns.
The rationale behind our approach is that although significant changes in the
amount of trading goods can be due to the market evolution, there is always a
number of cases where this behavior could be a sign of fraud. Our objective is
therefore to detect potential fraud schemes by identifying fraud-like, or abnormal,
patterns in the underlying data. Whether any extracted schemes can be actually
associated to suspected or established fraud will be based on further investigation
by anti-fraud domain experts.
Statistical fraud detection approaches may be ’supervised’ or ’unsupervised’.
In supervised approaches, samples of both fraudulent and non-fraudulent records
are used to construct models which allow one to assign new observations into one
of the two classes. Of course, this requires one to be confident about the true
classes of the original data used to build the models. It also requires that one has
examples of both classes. Furthermore, it can only be used to detect frauds of
a type which have previously occurred. In contrast, unsupervised approaches do
not require training samples with fraudulent and non-fraudulent cases and can
be effective even for new types of fraud. The unsupervised approaches usually
seek those cases which are most dissimilar from the norm. These can then be
examined more closely. Outliers are a basic form of non-standard observation.
A major assumption in our unsupervised modeling approach is that the future
behaves as the past, which implies that it can be described by the same mathe-
matical model. We also separate the available trade data series into a historical
data part and a present data part. Then, based on the past trade history, a
model of normal behavior is derived which is then compared to the present trade
data. As a result, significant changes which are not consistent with the model
are identified and further analyzed.
Our method represents an improvement of the method discussed in [10],
where an application to fraud detection in external trade has been considered.
Other data analysis tools have been applied successfully to detect activities such
as money laundering, e-commerce credit card fraud, telecommunications fraud,
computer intrusion and medical insurance. Some statistical tools, and the ar-
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eas in which statistical fraud detection technologies are most used, are discussed
in [4]. Artis, Ayuso and Guillen have described an approach to modeling fraud
behavior in car insurance ( [1], [2]). Fanning, Cogger and Srivastava ( [8]), and
Green, Calderon and Choi ( [6], [7]) have examined some classification methods
for detecting management fraud. Fraud detection tools have also been applied to
sporting events ( [3], [13]).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we introduce the
problem addressed in this paper. In section 3 the proposed unsupervised statis-
tical approach to fraud detection is described, while in section 4 some important
implementation issues are considered. Section 5 gives an example and section 6
concludes the paper.
2. Problem Formulation
One of the most frequent types of fraud encountered in Customs is the false
declaration of origin concerning the import of a product into the European Union
(EU) market ( [12]). There exist more than one reasons for declaring a false origin
for the trading goods, such as the circumvention of anti-dumping duties, or the
use of a preferential trade regime of another EU partner, or the existence of a
specific EU import quota which has been reached, etc. In all these cases, the
fraud consists in declaring that the product under consideration comes from an
EU partner other than the one actually exporting it. Thus, the fraud mechanism
typically includes an initial export from the first non-EU country, say country A,
to a second non-EU country, say country B, and the subsequent export from the
second non-EU country B towards one of the EU member states (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Simple fraud mechanism
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To be more specific, let us assume that the fraud consists in the circumvention
of anti-dumping duties which have been put in place at a certain point in time,
and for a specific EU partner country. That is, after a certain date, the duties
paid when importing a specific product from this partner into the EU market
are considerably higher than what it used to be. As a result, and in order to
avoid the extra money being paid, thus making the product more competitive on
the market, the EU partner could first export it to another non-EU country for
which no extra duties are imposed on the product under consideration, and then
from that country to the EU. In fact, very often more than one such “transfers”
between EU partners may take place in order to further hide the actual flow
of products. Thus, the trading goods might go through more than one non-EU
countries before actually reaching the EU borders, either in a sequential order or
in parallel, as illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 respectively, or even a combination
of the two.
Figure 2: Sequential fraud mechanism
Figure 3: Parallel fraud mechanism
Linker Fraud Detection 275
Our goal is trying to detect this sort of fraudulent situations based on the
trading quantities. The information at our disposal is the trade information
concerning the various trade flows between the different countries involved. As
far as the EU trade is concerned, specific imported and exported quantities are
available for all EU partners on a monthly basis. This implies that for the case of
Figure 1 both flowA and flowB related time series will be available for analysis,
while in the case of Figure 2 and 3, some intermediate trade flows, between non-
EU countries might not be known. In any case, only the known time series are
taken into account. The period of the available data under consideration will
include of course the specific point in time in which the anti-dumping duties
are introduced. Now assume for a moment that the situation is as depicted in
Figure 1. If the above mentioned fraud mechanism applies, then the monthly
exports from country A into the EU, that is flowA, should drop shortly after,
say with a delay d, the import duties have been introduced. On the other hand,
the monthly exports from country B into the EU market, that is flowB, should
rise as a result of the “transfer” from country A to country B. This rise in EU
imports from country B takes place say after a time delay D. This situation is
depicted in Figure 4, with d and D being the two time delays where, typically,
d is less than D. In case, of course, that more countries are involved as shown in
Figures 2 and 3, then more such increases could be actually happen, both between
non-EU countries in the case of Figure 2, and between EU and its partners in
the case of Figure 3. The corresponding time delays will vary, depending on
the individual case. Therefore, the fraud detection problem we are dealing with
can be summarized as follows: based on the available data flows between different
countries, in the form of monthly trade series, for a specific product, our objective
is to identify groups of trade flows following fraudulent patterns as explained
above and is illustrated in Figure 4 for the simplest case.
It is worth mentioning here that although reliable trade data for the EU
member states are readily available through the statistical office of the European
Union, or EUROSTAT, this is definitely not the case for trade information be-
tween non-EU countries. As a result, in the examples that follow, the analysis
will be based on the declarations of the EU member states only, and therefore no
trade information between non-EU countries will be taken into account. Note,
however, that the proposed method applies equally well to any kind of available
time series. It is just a matter of dealing with as much reliable information as
possible. For example, in the simple case of Figure 1, it is obvious that if the
trade flow from country A to country B were also available, it should then typi-
cally follow a pattern similar to that of flowB. Thus, in this simple case, being
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Figure 4: Opposite trade patterns
able to identify all three flows within the same group thus closing the “loop”,
would be a strong indication of suspected fraud under the above mentioned fraud
scheme.
3. Method
The fraud scheme extraction method we propose, eventually generates sets of
warning signs which when appropriately grouped together may lead into likely
fraud schemes. As we have already mentioned, the actual verification of commit-
ted fraud needs further anti-fraud investigations.
We follow an unsupervised statistical approach. We assume that the available
trade series represent realizations of random processes. Thus, for each trade series
there is a specific probability model describing the observations, and any fraud-
ulent behavior will typically cause the corresponding model to change. Based
on the observations we use time series analysis, as well as clustering, in order to
model the following concepts: Trade Flows, Warning Signs, and Fraud Schemes.
3.1. Trade Flow Modeling
We consider the available import export data between the various countries as
a collection of data flows that need to be examined. Time series data often has
Linker Fraud Detection 277
a pattern which repeats every s-time periods. Monthly data may have seasonal
period s = 12. The import/export of a product from one country to another
may repeats itself every 12 months. Randomness in the seasonal patterns from
one cycle to the next is possible. In other words, the import/export quantities
are not so much related from month to month as they are from year to year.
The question is how to model the import/export series so that dependence both
on neighboring months and on months from the previous years to be taken into
account.
In order to model the stochastic mechanism that gives rise to the observed
data over time we use time series analysis based on sARIMA (seasonal Auto
Regressive Integrated Moving Average) models, known as the Box-Jenkins ap-
proach. Box-Jenkins methodology is a class of linear time series forecasting
techniques that capture the linear dependency of the future values on the past
values. They are able to model a wide spectrum of time series behavior. A
sARIMA(p, d, q)(P,D,Q)s model includes the following types of parameters: the
autoregressive parameters (p, P ), the number of differencing passes (d,D), the
moving average parameters (q,Q), and the seasonal period s.
The {Xt} process is an sARIMA(p, d, q)(P,D,Q)s if the differenced series
Yt = (1−B)
d(1−Bs)DXt is a process defined by ϕ(B)Φ(B
s)Yt = θ(B)Θ(B
s)Zt,
{Zt}∈ WhiteNoise(0, σ
2), where d and D are nonnegative integers, ϕ(z) = 1 −
ϕ1z − · · · − ϕpz
p, Φ(z) = 1 − Φ1z − · · · − Φpz
p, θ(z) = 1 − θ1z − · · · − θqz
q,
Θ(z) = 1−Θ1z−· · ·−Θqz
q, and both ϕ(z) 6= 0 and Φ(z) 6= 0 for [z] ≤ 1 (see [5]).
In modeling real data it might not be reasonable to assume that the seasonal
component repeats itself precisely in the same way cycle after cycle. Seasonal
ARIMA models allow for randomness in the seasonal pattern from one cycle to
the next.
In a traditional ARIMA methodology the user must specify the model. The
determination of an appropriate sARIMA(p, d, q)(P,D,Q)12 model to represent
an observed time series involves a number of interrelated problems. A distinctive
feature of the data that suggests the appropriateness of an ARIMA model is the
slowly decaying positive sample autocorrelation function. Trend and seasonality
are also characterized by autocorrelation functions that are slowly decaying and
nearly periodic, respectively.
It is not advantageous from a forecasting point of view to choose the au-
toregressive and the moving average parameters arbitrarily large. Fitting a very
high order model will generally result in a small estimated white noise variance,
but when the fitted model is used for forecasting, the mean squared error of the
forecasts will depend not only on the white noise variance of the fitted model but
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also on errors arising from estimation of the parameters of the model. These will
be larger for higher-order models ( [5]).
Thus the traditional model selection process typically requires expert experi-
ence. In our approach the model is automatically selected. Our prime criterion
for parameters selection is the Akike Information Criterion (AIC), defined as
AIC = −2lnLx + 2npar, where lnLx is the log-likelihood value and npar repre-
sents the number of parameters in the fitted model (see [15]). We choose the
fitted model with smallest AIC value. A small difference in AIC value (less
than 2) between two satisfactory models may be ignored in the interest of model
simplicity.
The estimates of the noise in a probability model are the residuals. If there
is no dependence between the residuals we estimate their mean and variance. If
there is significant dependence among the residuals we look for a more complex
stationary time series model. Dependence means that past observations can assist
in predicting future values. Final selection of the model depends on the results
from a variety of goodness of fit tests, such as Ljung-Box test for independence,
Shapiro-Wilk test for normality and the sample autocorrelation function of the
residuals. If the residuals are not consistent with their expected behavior under
the minimum AIC model then competing models should be checked until we find
a model that passes the goodness of fit tests.
Trade data flows can be further analyzed with a view to identifying warning
signs as we explain below.
3.2. Warning Sign Modeling
A fraud detection method for trade, should somehow be able to assign either a
suspect or a normal profile to trade time series. Forecasting techniques help us
to understand past events, discern patterns and project those patterns into the
future. Thus, we can perform time series forecasting and identify warning signs,
pointing to a suspect behavior.
Let n be the total number of observations at a given time. We select the first
k observations X1, X2, . . . , Xk, k < n, from the data series, and for each import
trade flow we derive a model of normal behavior based on this trade history
represented by the selected observations. Then we compute the forecast values
Xforecasti , i = k + 1, . . . , n, by applying the model derived from the historical
data. We also know the observed values Xi, i = k + 1, . . . , n, and we shall define
the notion of warning sign in such a way as to indicate whether the predicted
values are significantly different from the corresponding observed ones. Significant
difference means that the observed value Xi is outside the γ% prediction interval,
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denoted as (aiγ ,b
i
γ). Usually the level of confidence is γ = 95. Thus, we define the
warning sign WSi for each observed value Xi, i = k + 1, . . . , n in the following
way:
WSi =


Xi − b
i
γ if Xi > b
i
γ
Xi − a
i
γ if Xi < a
i
γ
0 if aiγ ≤ Xi ≤ b
i
γ
where (aiγ ,b
i
γ) is the γ% prediction interval.
As illustrated in Figure 5, for the simplest type of fraud scheme considered in
Figure 1, it is expected that both flowA and flowB will lead to non-zero warning
signs whose opposite sign indicate the possibility of an underlying fraudulent
situation, as explained in section 2.
Figure 5: Warning signs
In fact, once such warning signs are detected, they can be further analyzed
with a view to identifying potential fraud schemes. Our approach on how to
proceed further is explained in the next subsection.
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3.3. Fraud Scheme Modeling
Recall from section 2, that our goal is to identify groups of trade flows having
fraudulent patterns that match the fraud schemes under consideration. Since the
warning signs we defined above actually point to suspect trade flows, then it is
the combination of different warning signs that can lead to the identification of
suspect fraud schemes. Broadly speaking, this combination can be done based
either on specific trade fraud scenarios, or on abnormal trade behavior in general.
We proceed as follows.
For the observed monthly period [k+1, n] we summarize the behavior of each
trade flow, that corresponds to a pattern for the data series, by means of the
following characteristics:
• the mean of the historical values Hm = 1
k
∑k
i=1 Xi
• the mean of the warning signs Sm = 1
n−k
∑n
i=k+1 WSi, and
• the ratio R =


Sm
Hm
100% if Hm > 1
Sm100% if 0 ≤ Hm ≤ 1
Based on these three variables, we cluster the data series, thus extracting
different groups of trade flows with similar patterns, using cluster analysis. The
dataset for clustering has the structure m×p objects-by-attributes matrix, where
rows stand for objects (the time series) and columns stand for the three inter-
val scaled variables (Hm,Sm,R ) measured on the time series. We apply the
Partitioning Around Medoids (PAM) method described in [9] with manhattan
metric. It is robust with respect to outliers and other violations of the assump-
tion of spherically normal clusters because it is based on sums of non-squared
distances. The overall quality of the partition is measured by the average silhou-
ette width [14]. This index allows a reasonable data structure to be automatically
found.
The overall objective during this clustering process is to come up with an
appropriate number of clusters which can be further examined, so that either
suspect and/or abnormal trade flow combinations can be identified and extracted.
4. Implementation issues
There exist a number of issues, from an anti-fraud point of view, which will
greatly affect the pattern of any extracted fraud schemes, and for which expert
advice from anti-fraud practitioners, can lead to far better results than making
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some generic modeling assumptions based on the modeling parameters we just
introduced in section 3. A number of these issues are discussed in the sequel.
4.1. Kinds of clusters
Since we are interested in significantly changing patterns, we expect to identify a
main large cluster of flows corresponding to normal patterns with zero warning
signs, as well as a number of relatively smaller clusters having either negative
or positive warning sign values. Thus, we would generally expect five kinds of
clusters, which we shall describe as follows:
• Normal - Clusters of trade flows having stable patterns
• Highly Increasing - Clusters of trade flows having significantly increasing
patterns
• Increasing - Clusters of trade flows having relatively increasing patterns
• Highly Decreasing - Clusters of trade flows having significantly decreasing
patterns
• Decreasing - Clusters of trade flows having relatively decreasing patterns
Then, for the simple case shown in Figures 1 and 4, flowA would ideally
belong to a Highly Decreasing cluster, while flowB would rather be in a Highly
Increasing cluster. Furthermore, the fact that the two flows are related through
the same importing party (the EU, in this case), can be used to identify and
assign the two flows into a common context of a suspected fraud scheme of this
sort.
The same procedure can be applied in a straightforward way to the more
general cases illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. Of course, this depends on the
availability of the corresponding trade data and, as we already mentioned in
section 2, it might be difficult to obtain reliable data for trade between non-EU
countries. However, by clustering all available trade flows into a maximum of 5
kinds of clusters, as explained above, and by appropriately combining the results
through any common parties involved, more sophisticated fraud schemes can be
identified.
4.2. Aggregate information
It is often the case that a specific fraud scheme might concern transfers of goods
that can be better identified and explained if one considers a given set of countries
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as a whole, rather than each member individually. This is, for example, the case
of EU in the simple example of Figure 1 and 4 where EU comprises the member
states of the European Union. Depending on the fraud scheme, it can include
the 10 new member states, in which case we would rather talk about EU25, or
it can contain only the 15 member states before the 1st of May 2004, thus being
referred to as EU15. Of course, if it is likely that the suspected fraud is at an
individual country level, then we would include all individual trade flows related
to each member state. Note, also, that we can even analyze both individual
and aggregate information together, as far as the resulting clusters are correctly
interpreted. Therefore, the decision on the specific trade flows to be included in
the overall analysis strongly depends on the underlying fraud scheme model, and
it should be taken in an early stage since it affects the trade flow modeling as
well.
4.3. Prediction period
The period [k +1, n] chosen for the prediction of the trade series plays an impor-
tant role in the extraction of potential fraud schemes. Typically, we’ll assume a
default period of six months, k + 1, k + 2, k + 3, k + 4, k + 5, k + 6, which both
takes care of the problem of wrong declarations between consecutive months due
to delays in customs procedures, and represents a fairly wide time frame for de-
tecting significantly changing trade patterns. Thus, the parameter prediction
period should be chosen carefully in the beginning of the overall analysis process.
The starting point k + 1 is chosen as the month next to the one which might
have triggered such an anti-fraud analysis in the first place. For example, in the
anti-dumping case mentioned in section 2, it could represent the month of the
introduction of the extra duties.
Another issue closely related to the prediction period, is how one deals with
new data becoming available after time n. The approach we take in this paper is
the following. We repeat the trade flow modeling phase by including the observed
values Xk+1, Xk+2 . . . , Xk+6 for the months k+1, k+2, k+3, k+4, k+5, k+6 into
the historical set of values, and considering the new prediction period [k+7, k+12].
New warning sign variables are calculated and clustering analysis is applied again,
thus resulting in a new set of clusters subject to interpretation. Following the
same approach for each new set of observed values, allows us to identify significant
changes appearing later than the initial prediction period, but which might still
relate to the possible triggering event back in time k.
We should finally mention here that, as far as the clustering phase is con-
cerned, one can even cluster together the overall results coming from the different
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prediction periods under consideration. By doing so, one can get clusters of trade
flows with similar characteristics but related to different prediction periods, thus
allowing one to extract potential fraud patterns spread over a more extended
period of time.
5. Example
The proposed method is applied to a real investigation case regarding exports
of large quantities of a specific product from a specific non-EU country towards
the rest of the world, thus including the EU member states. For confidentiality
purposes, they will be referred to as Product and Partner1, respectively. The
main objective is establishing to what extent (if any) the Product is deviated
through other non-EU countries before entering the EU territory, thus benefiting
by more favorable duty rates applicable there. In fact, a quantitative upper
limit (quota) to EU imports coming from Partner1 has been set up in an annual
basis, so that quantities exceeding this limit are subject to duty rates which are
approximately ten times higher. Furthermore, because of the enlargement process
in the European Union that took place on May 1st, 2004, exports from Partner1
to the 10 new member states before and after that date could be examined, given
the possibility that the same goods can be re-exported from the new member
states to the old ones after the accession, thus benefiting from zero duty rates due
to the EU common market. In both these cases, the underlying trade activities
might involve some fraudulent behavior in the sense of compliance to the EU
specific regulations on this matter. Keep in mind, however, that our method is
not restricted only to a specific partner country, so that any other EU partner
with a significant changing trade flow, leading to highly likely fraud scheme or
showing abnormal behavior, will also be identified during the overall extraction
process.
We shall now identify the specific trade flows that directly relate to these
two slightly different causes of potential fraud, with a view to identifying the
underlying data series which will be included in the analysis. First of all, the
exports from Partner1 to the EU15 are of great importance in both cases, and
they are available through the Comext database of Eurostat, so that they will be
included in the analysis. Note that the EU15 is considered as a whole, since we
are interested to the overall EU15 imports and furthermore the member states
have the same import duties. The corresponding trade flow, is illustrated in
Figure 6.
The exports of all non-EU15 countries towards the EU will also be included,
and they are also available in Comext, through the import declarations of the
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member states. The trade flows from Partner1 to the rest of non-EU15 countries
would be also very useful, and although they could be partially available from
other sources, they will not be included in our analysis since their reliability is
often questionable. However, because of the enlargement process we mentioned
above, 13 candidate countries which will be referred to as CC13 had already
started reporting trade information in Comext since 1999. Therefore, also the
available trade flows of exports from non-EU15 countries towards these 13 can-
didate countries (of which 10 represent today the new member states of the EU)
will be included in our analysis. Note, that this also includes trade between all
the 13 CC’s, having different input duty rates before the enlargement date of
May 1st, 2004. Figure 7 illustrates all these relevant trade flows which will be
taken into account in this example. MSi, CCi, and Partneri, denote an EU
Member State, a Candidate Country, and a country from the rest of the world,
respectively. For the sake of simplicity, each of the arrows we used, contains any
existing trade flows for all possible pairs (i, j).
As far as the prediction period is concerned, we shall consider two consecutive
6-month time intervals. The first is the interval from January to June 2004, or
[200401, 200406], that is, mainly before the enlargement process and in which
the potential fraud could be due to differences in import duty rates between the
EU and any other country in general. The historical information will include the
observed values in the 2-year period [200201, 200312]. Next, we shall also consider
the prediction period [200407, 200412], which is well after the enlargement date.
Thus, in this case, potential fraud could be also due to the import duty rates
of the old member states, with respect to the new member states, which do not
Figure 6: Trade flow from Partner1 to EU15
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Figure 7: Relevant trade flows
exist anymore. Here, the historical information will include the observed values
in the period [200201, 200406] which corresponds to 2 + 1/2 years.
The implementation is done by means of the R statistical software ( [11]).
5.1. First Prediction Period
We apply our method for the prediction interval from January to June 2004.
The total number of trade flows, in the sense of Figure 7, and for which at least
one non-zero monthly quantity appears in the corresponding trade data series
during the overall period, from January 2002 to June 2004, is 146. Using the
Figure 8: Trade flow from Partner2 to EU15
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PAM method with manhattan metric we find 4 meaningful clusters. A Normal
cluster of size 132 (i.e. containing 132 data series) with stable patterns, a Highly
Increasing singleton cluster with the following characteristics
Exporter Importer Hm Sm R
Partner2 EU15 6.5 117 1800
and its corresponding trade series shown in Figure 8, an Increasing cluster of
size 8, containing trade flows with the following characteristics
Exporter Importer Hm Sm R
****** ****** 0.004 4.167 416.672
***** ****** 1.433 6.375 444.782
***** ****** 1.475 6.742 457.074
***** ****** 0 10.5 1050
***** ****** 0 4.485 448.5
***** ****** 0 3.333 333.333
***** ****** 0 7 700
***** ****** 5.055 13.209 261.331
and, finally, another Normal cluster of size 5 with trade flows as follows
Exporter Importer Hm Sm R
****** ****** 1065.638 116.185 10.903
Partner1 EU15 1302.642 20.794 1.596
***** ****** 1041.138 -134.801 -12.947
***** ****** 570.175 -167.818 -29.433
***** ****** 804.443 -182.435 -22.678
and which represents the cluster of the “top” exporters as we can see form the
variable Hm. (Asterisks, instead of names, have been used for confidentiality
purposes only). These “top flows” can have an either positive or negative ratio
R, but they are considered as normal because this number is small, compared
to that in the previous two clusters. On the other hand, even a small R can
imply a big difference in absolute quantities, and this is very important from an
anti-fraud point of view, due to the increased value of money involved. Thus,
this kind of Normal clusters must always be examined thoroughly. Note, in fact,
that the second line corresponds to the flow from Partner1 to EU15, illustrated
in Figure 6.
As a result of the clustering process for this first prediction interval, Part-
ner2 would be pointed out as an emerging exporter whose activity regarding the
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underlying product must be further examined by antifraud investigators.
5.2. Second Prediction Period
We now apply our method for the prediction interval from July to December 2004.
In this case, the total number of available trade flows according to Figure 7, and
for which at least one non-zero monthly quantity appears in the corresponding
trade data series during the overall period, from January 2002 to December 2004,
is 160.
Here, the PAM method with manhattan metric yields 5 clusters. A Normal
cluster of size 149 with stable patterns, a Highly Increasing singleton cluster with
the following characteristics
Exporter Importer Hm Sm R
Partner3 CC1 0 87.5 8750
another Highly Increasing singleton cluster with
Exporter Importer Hm Sm R
Partner4 CC1 0 58.333 5833.333
an Increasing cluster of size 5, containing trade flows with the following char-
acteristics
Exporter Importer Hm Sm R
****** ****** 0 31.55 3155
***** ****** 0 17.333 1733.333
***** ****** 0 17 1700
***** ****** 0 13 1300
Partner5 CC1 0.02 24.623 2462.297
and, finally, another Normal cluster of size 4 with trade flows as follows
Exporter Importer Hm Sm R
****** ****** 1418.923 0 0
Partner1 EU15 1241.587 64.119 5.164
Partner1 CC1 945.917 -143.846 -15.207
***** ****** 843.929 -134.512 -15.939
which, as in the previous case, represents the cluster of the “top” exporters.
We notice that, in this case, there is one less trade flow than before, which im-
plies that one flow being close to the border between the two Normal clusters,
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was assigned to the large one.
Consider now the two flows related to Partner1. We see that its exports to
EU15 are increasing, while at the same time, those to the candidate country CC1,
which is furthermore a new EU member state after May 1st 2004, are decreasing.
This combination could suggest a potential fraud scheme as depicted in Figure 1,
with country A being Partner1 and country B being CC1. As we mentioned be-
fore, although in both cases the ratio R is not very big, the underlying quantities
could be of importance because of the large absolute quantities involved. To be
more specific, the fraud could consist in exports from Partner1 towards the EU15
deviated through the new member state CC1, before the prediction period, while
the opposite behavior we notice here would imply that the deviation stopped dur-
ing the prediction period. This opposite behavior is also evident if we compare
Figure 9 which illustrates the flow from Partner1 to CC1, with Figure 6 which
shows the flow from Partner1 to EU15. Finally, in Figure 10, the exports from
CC1 to EU15 are also illustrated. Comparing Figure 10 with Figure 9, we see
that they both have a peak in August 2003, while exports from CC1 to EU15
have considerably dropped after the accession date. In any case, in order to draw
any conclusions, further verification is required by anti-fraud domain experts.
Figure 9: Trade flow from Partner1 to new member state CC1
Let us now compare the third flow in this cluster of “top” exporters, which
corresponds to the decreasing flow of exports from Partner1 to the new member
state CC1, with the flows we highlighted in the other clusters. We see that the
same importing country appears in the two Highly Increasing singleton clusters,
as well as in one flow in the Increasing cluster. Figure 11 shows the three flows of
exports from Partner3, Partner4, and Partner5 towards the new member state
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CC1.
By comparing Figure 9 with Figure 11, we see that on the one hand CC1
imports from Partner1 are decreasing, but on the other hand, simultaneously,
its imports from the other three partners (with no activity registered before) are
increasing. This situation suggests than the activity of these partner countries
should be further examined by anti-fraud experts with a view to verifying, first,
whether their exports are subject to favorable EU duty rates, and second, the
real origin of the trading products. The potential fraud scheme could be the one
shown in Figure 12, that is, some of the trading products instead of going directly
Figure 10: Trade flow from CC1 to EU15
Figure 11: Trade flows from Partners 3,4,5 to new member state CC1
290 Ch. Moussas, V. Noncheva
into the new member state CC1 (dotted line), they are deviated through the other
three countries. In fact, the results of this specific case have been brought to the
attention of the European anti-fraud office (OLAF) for further investigation.
Figure 12: The Potential fraud scheme
6. Conclusion
In this paper we presented a technique for extracting potential fraud schemes
from trade data series. Our work was motivated by fraud detection in external
trade, as well as other applications that could benefit from efficient change de-
tection and extraction mechanisms applied to time series. We implemented time
series forecast models which allowed us to define and detect significant changes
through the use of warning sign models. Based on three attributes, namely the
sample mean of the historical data, the sample mean of the warning signs, and
their ratio, we were able to cluster the trade time series into a number of mean-
ingful classes which lend themselves to the identification of fraudulent patterns.
We applied the method to a real case of anti-fraud investigation and the results
implied that, depending on the kind of the available data, our approach can come
up with highly valuable information for the fraud schemes under consideration.
They also pointed to the potential of use of our technique as a building block for
a sophisticated fraud extraction system based on data and statistical knowledge
guided reasoning. Finally, these results were actually forwarded to the appropri-
ate anti-fraud authorities for further verification.
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